High Court Eliminates “Background Circumstances” as a Requirement in “Reverse Discrimination” Cases

On June 5, 2025, the Supreme Court in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services unanimously struck down the Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule, which had required majority-group plaintiffs to meet a heightened evidentiary standard to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII. 

Background

Ames, an agency administrator and heterosexual woman, was demoted by her employer. Soon thereafter, the employer promoted a gay man to fill her former position. Based on this decision, Ames filed a lawsuit in federal court asserting a claim under Title VII for sexual orientation discrimination.

The district court granted summary judgment to the employer and Ames appealed. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, relying on the fact that Ames had failed to establish the presence of “background circumstances.” At least five circuit courts have held that when “the alleged discrimination is against a member of the majority” (referred to as “reverse discrimination”), Title VII claims must be supported by evidence of “background circumstances.”¹ To satisfy this requirement, plaintiffs asserting reverse discrimination claims in these circuits must generally demonstrate that a particular employer has “reason or inclination” to discriminate against the majority group (e.g., men, whites, heterosexuals) or that there is “something fishy” about the facts.

As the Sixth Circuit noted, Ames had not presented evidence that a gay employee made the decision to demote her or that her employer had engaged in a pattern of discrimination against heterosexuals. Without this type of evidence, the Sixth Circuit concluded, Ames could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination and her claim was therefore properly dismissed. Ames appealed to the Supreme Court.

“Background Circumstances” Requirement Is Inconsistent with Title VII

Writing for the Court, Justice Jackson stated that the “background circumstances” requirement is incompatible with both the text of Title VII and the Court’s longstanding precedent. Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision prohibits discrimination against “any individual” based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin – without distinguishing between majority and minority-group plaintiffs. The Court held that imposing a unique burden on majority-group plaintiffs in therefore inappropriate.

The decision also emphasized that the rule contradicts the Court’s directive to avoid rigid application of the prima facie framework, as it imposes a uniform evidentiary hurdle on all majority-group plaintiffs regardless of context.

In rejecting the rule, the Court dismissed Ohio’s argument that the “background circumstances” requirement is merely a method for assessing whether the employment decision was based on a statutorily protected trait. Citing the Sixth Circuit’s own language, the Court pointed out that the plaintiff in Ames was required to meet the additional element, and that her failure to do so led to dismissal at summary judgment.

Although Ohio urged the Court to affirm the lower court’s decision on alternate grounds, the Court declined, stating that doing so would require resolving issues not addressed by the Sixth Circuit and beyond the scope of the question presented. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration under the “proper” prima facie standard.

Justice Thomas’ Concurring Opinion Calls the Propriety of McDonnell Douglas into Question

In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch, Justice Thomas criticized the creation of legal doctrines without a basis in the statutory text, warning that such “[j]udge-made doctrines have a tendency to distort the underlying statutory text, impose unnecessary burdens on litigants, and cause confusion for courts.” Justice Thomas identified the “background circumstances” rule as one such example and expressed openness to reconsidering the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, describing it as a “judge-made evidentiary ‘tool’” with “no basis in the text of Title VII.” 

Implications for Employers

The Supreme Court’s decision in Ames requires that the discrimination claims of all Title VII plaintiffs—regardless of whether they are members of a majority or minority group—be evaluated under the same legal framework. The ruling eliminates the “background circumstances” requirement previously applied in some circuits, which had imposed a heightened evidentiary burden on majority-group plaintiffs.

Importantly, the decision does not alter the core legal standards of discrimination claims. Employers may still use the statutory framework, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, and other established defenses to demonstrate that employment decisions were based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.

While removing the “background circumstances” requirement may make it more difficult for employers in certain jurisdictions to secure early dismissal of reverse discrimination claims, it does not change the ultimate burden of proof. Most federal circuits had already rejected the heightened standard, and there appears to have been no surge in successful reverse discrimination claims in those jurisdictions. This suggests that a significant increase in successful claims is unlikely, even in circuits where the standard has now changed.

The ruling does, however, eliminate a key defense previously available to employers in some jurisdictions, potentially exposing diversity initiatives to greater legal scrutiny. Employers should work closely with counsel to review whether any current practices—such as preferences based on protected characteristics or the structure of employee resource groups—could raise compliance concerns.

In short, Ames may open the door slightly wider for reverse discrimination claims to survive past early procedural stages, but it does not alter the legal standards that determine whether those claims ultimately succeed. It appears that well-documented inclusion, equity and diversity initiatives that do not rely on protected characteristics in decision-making will still be defensible under Title VII.